Dilemmas of US Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990
" Dealing with Dictators will be valuable to readers interested in American foreign policy and the contributions intelligence has made or failed to make in given cases. The explanation of the varying perspectives of the intelligence collector, analyst, and decision maker is a particularly important contribution. Today, we have the opportunity to evaluate policy decisions with the benefit of years of hindsight, but those depicted here had to advise and decide with what information they had, which was often conflicting and muddled." -- Bob Graham , U.S. Senator, 1987--2005, Former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and author of Intelligence Matters "In a riveting account, Ernest May and Philip Zelikow describe the delicate interplay between intelligence and policy deliberation that has shaped presidential decisions on how to intervene in foreign crises. The lesson of the case studies is that the intelligence community, far from being inept, often provides accurate intelligence analysis for the president and valuable covert action options that extend his diplomatic and military choices."-John Deutch , Former Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Institute Professor, MIT
Ernest R. May is Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard University. He is co-author, with Philip D. Zelikow, of The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Philip D. Zelikow is former Director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs and White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia and is currently serving as counselor of the State Department. Zelikow recently served as the Executive Director of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, better known as the "9/11 Commission." Zelikow is co-author, with Ernest R. May, of The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis.