Nuclear Deterrence In U.s.-soviet Relations (häftad)
Fler böcker inom
Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
258
Utgivningsdatum
2019-06-07
Förlag
Routledge
Antal komponenter
1
ISBN
9780367020071

Nuclear Deterrence In U.s.-soviet Relations

Inbunden,  Engelska, 2019-06-07
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This book critically examines U.S. attempts to establish a nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union and offers new approaches to dealing with the changing strategic environment. Dr. Payne maintains that the most influential theories of nuclear deterrence--Assured Vulnerability and Flexible Targetingare unrealistic, given Soviet foreign policy and attitudes toward nuclear war, and no longer adequately meet the requirements of U.S. national security. Identifying an approach compatible with U.S. security commitments, he argues that future U.S. policy should focus on defeating the "Soviet theory of victory"--on threatening Soviet military forces and domestic and external political control assets, while also defending the U.S. against nuclear attack. The discussion covers recent developments, among them the "new nuclear strategy" of the Carter administration and President Reagan's new weapons program.
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Fler böcker av Keith B Payne

Övrig information

Payne, Keith B.

Innehållsförteckning

A Westview Replica Edition -- Foreword -- Introduction -- The Assured Vulnerability Model of Deterrence -- Assured Vulnerability and the United States Strategic Force Posture -- The Inadequacy of Assured Vulnerability -- The Soviet Union: A Status Quo Power? -- Soviet Strategic Thought -- The Strategic Balance and the Value of Superiority -- An Adequate Theory of Deterrence: A Balanced Approach to Offense and Defense -- Summary and Conclusion