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Köp båda 2 för 562 krThis book was first published in 2004. Under what conditions, in what ways, and with what effects do actors engage in politics with respect to, rather than merely within, political institutions? Using multiple methods and original data, Procedural...
The human condition teems with institutions - intertemporal social arrangements that shape human relations in support of particular values - and the social scientific work developed over the last five decades aimed at understanding them is similar...
'Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal have written a pathbreaking book on the politics of institutional choice relating to global commerce. Developing a novel approach grounded in bounded rationality, the authors demonstrate why the process of institutional change is often piece-meal, disjointed, and inefficient judged by standards of global efficiency.' James Caporaso, Director of the European Union Center for Excellence, University of Washington, Seattle
'Jupille, Mattli and Snidal provide us with one of the most cogent and comprehensive accounts of institutional choice and change to date. Melding together historical institutionalism with more rationalist accounts of politics, the book explains why institutional reform is difficult and should not be expected under 'normal' conditions. This is critical reading for all scholars of international relations.' Judith Goldstein, Janet Peck Professor of International Communication and Professor of Political Science, Stanford University
'The authors provide a novel theoretical approach to a world of proliferating international institutions that frequently underperform. They illuminate institutional creation, persistence, and change in the face of a constantly evolving global agenda.' Miles Kahler, University of California, San Diego
'In this interesting and rich new book, Jupille, Mattli and Snidal stake out a theoretically-principled approach to international institutions between pure rational design and pure path-dependency. In their theory, actors are boundedly rational and usually rely on existing institutions or modify them slightly, even when the institutions are suboptimal. But, as the authors show, there are specific, predictable circumstances when they will try to craft new institutions to meet new problems. This clear, readable analysis weaves together theory and empirical tests to shed new light on why institutions persist, why new ones are built, and how states select and use international institutions.' Charles Lipson, Peter B. Ritzma Professor in Political Science, University of Chicago
Joseph Jupille is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Walter Mattli is Professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Fellow of St John's College, Oxford. Duncan Snidal is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford.
Part I: 1. Introduction: institutional choice and global commerce; 2. International institutional choice: cooperation, alternatives, and strategies; 3. Building Theseus' ship: why the ITO failed, the GATT succeeded, and the WTO emerged; Part II: 4. Creating the first international court of commercial dispute resolution: the Mixed Courts of Egypt; 5. Commercial complexity and institutional choice in the GATT era; 6. Institutional choice in global accounting governance; Part III: 7. Conclusion: overview and institutional theories compared.