Economics of Securities Law (inbunden)
Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
1616
Utgivningsdatum
2016-03-25
Förlag
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Dimensioner
254 x 177 x 95 mm
Vikt
2993 g
ISBN
9781783471812
Economics of Securities Law (inbunden)

Economics of Securities Law

Inbunden Engelska, 2016-03-25
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Bringing together the most important articles from leading authors in the field, Professor Geoffrey Miller's new collection, Economics of Securities Law, is an essential resource for students, policymakers and those interested in the history and current status of the subject. The papers included represent fundamental contributions that shaped later thinking, illustrate approaches that have proven durably influential or represent important challenges to conventional views. The collection also explores new approaches, such as behavioural economics, alongside 'Chicago School' papers, comparative analyses and influential works by people involved in the creation of laws governing modern securities markets.
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Övrig information

Edited by Geoffrey P. Miller, Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law, New York University, School of Law, US

Innehållsförteckning

Contents: Introduction Geoffrey P. Miller PART I ORIGINS 1. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1991), 'Origin of the Blue Sky Laws', Texas Law Review, 70 (2), December, 347-97 2. William O. Douglas and George E. Bates (1933), 'The Federal Securities Act of 1933', Yale Law Journal, 43 (2), December, 171-217 PART II DISCLOSURE 3. George J. Stigler (1964), 'Public Regulation of the Securities Markets', Journal of Business, 37 (2), April, 117-42 4. George J. Benston (1973), 'Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934', American Economic Review, 63 (1), March, 132-55 5. Gregg A. Jarrell (1981), 'The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues', Journal of Law and Economics, 24 (3), December, 613-75 6. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1984), 'Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors', Virginia Law Review, 70 (4), May, 669-715 7. John C. Coffee, Jr. (1984), 'Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System', Virginia Law Review, 70 (4), May, 717-53 8. Paul G. Mahoney (1995), 'Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems', University of Chicago Law Review, 62 (3), Summer, 1047-112 9. Douglas W. Diamond (1985), 'Optimal Release of Information by Firms', Journal of Finance, 40 (4), September, 1071-94 PART III EFFICIENT MARKETS 10. Eugene F. Fama (1970), 'Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work', Journal of Finance, Papers and Proceedings, 25 (2), May, 383-417 11. Michael C. Jensen (1978), 'Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency', Journal of Financial Economics, 6 (2-3), June-September, 95-101 12. Charles M.C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer and Richard H. Thaler (1991), 'Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle', Journal of Finance, 46 (1), March, 75-109 13. Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), 'On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets', American Economic Review, 70 (3), June, 393-408 14. Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman (2014), 'Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs', Virginia Law Review, 100 (2), April, 313-75 PART IV ASSET PRICING AND DIVERSIFICATION 15. Harry Markowitz (1952), 'Portfolio Selection', Journal of Finance, 7 (1), March, 77-91 16. William F. Sharpe (1964), 'Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk', Journal of Finance, 19 (3), September, 425-42 PART V SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 17. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1990), 'Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory', Stanford Law Review, 42, April, 1059-92 18. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2006), 'Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation', Columbia Law Review, 106 (7), November, 1534-86 19. Donald C. Langevoort (2009), 'Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market', Wisconsin Law Review, 2009 (2), April, 151-98 Index Volume II An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I PART I TAKEOVERS 1. Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110-20 2. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer', Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April, 1161-204 3. Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers', Harvard Law Review, 95, 1028-56 4. Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence', Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1-4), April, 5-50 PART II INSIDER TRADING 5. Henry G. Manne (1966), 'In Defense of Insider Trading', Harvard Business Review, 44, November-December, 113-22 6. Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), 'The Regulation of Insider Trading', Stanford Law Review, 35, May, 85