Economics of Financial Law (inbunden)
Fler böcker inom
Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
1584
Utgivningsdatum
2016-02-26
Förlag
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Illustrationer
illustrations
Dimensioner
247 x 171 x 88 mm
Vikt
2925 g
ISBN
9781783471829
Economics of Financial Law (inbunden)

Economics of Financial Law

Inbunden Engelska, 2016-02-26
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Covering the most important areas of the subject, such as financial crises, the nature of the banking firm and issues in bank regulation, Economics of Financial Law is a comprehensive collection of the papers that have shaped the field of financial law. This original research review by editor Professor Geoffrey Miller provides a thorough and authoritative examination of the material and will prove to be an invaluable resource for academics and practitioners alike.
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Fler böcker av Geoffrey P Miller

Övrig information

Edited by Geoffrey P. Miller, Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law, New York University, School of Law, US

Innehållsförteckning

Contents: Introduction Geoffrey P. Miller PART I THE NATURE OF THE BANKING FIRM 1. George J. Benston (2004), 'What's Special About Banks?', Financial Review, 39 (1), February, 13-33 2. Martin Hellwig (1998), 'Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (1), March, 328-45 3. Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and Jeremy C. Stein (2002), 'Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking', Journal of Finance, 57 (1), February, 33-73 4. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2001), 'Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking', Journal of Political Economy, 109 (2), April, 287-327 PART II SHADOW BANKS 5. Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick (2010), 'Regulating the Shadow Banking System', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 41 (2), Fall, 261-312 6. Morgan Ricks (2012), 'A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability', Vanderbilt Law Review, 65 (5), October, 1289-360 PART III LIQUIDITY 7. Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn (1991), 'The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements', American Economic Review, 81 (3), June, 497-513 8. Gary Gorton and George Pennacchi (1990), 'Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation', Journal of Finance, 45 (1), March, 49-71 PART IV LENDING 9. Gary Gorton and James Kahn (2000), 'The Design of Bank Loan Contracts', Review of Financial Studies, 13 (2), April, 331-64 10. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner (1979), 'On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants', Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (2), June, 117-61 11. Douglas W. Diamond (1984), 'Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring', Review of Economic Studies, 51 (3), July, 393-414 12. Franklin Allen and Anthony M. Santomero (1997), 'The Theory of Financial Intermediation', Journal of Banking and Finance, 21 (11-12), December, 1461-85 PART V CAPITAL 13. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2000), 'A Theory of Bank Capital', Journal of Finance, 55 (6), December, 2431-65 14. Berry K. Wilson and Edward J. Kane (1996), 'The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders', NBER Working Paper No. 5848, December, i, 2-24, notes 15. Benjamin C. Esty (1998), 'The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking', Journal of Financial Economics, 47 (2), February, 189-218 16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2011), 'Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight', Columbia Law Review, 111 (4), May, 795-847 17. Patrick Bolton and Frederic Samama (2012), 'Capital Access Bonds: Contingent Capital with an Option to Convert', Economic Policy, 27 (70), April, 277-317 18. Charles W. Calomiris and Richard J. Herring (2013), 'How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem', Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 25 (2), Spring, 39-62 PART VI BANK RUNS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 19. Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), 'Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity', Journal of Political Economy, 91 (3), June, 401-19 20. Charles W. Calomiris (1990), 'Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective', Journal of Economic History, 50 (2), June, 283-95 Index Volume II Acknowledgements An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I PART I FINANCIAL CRISES 1. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933), 'First Fireside Chat, Delivered on 12th March 1933', [accessed at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14540, 09.07.2015], re-set 2. Viral V. Acharya (2009), 'A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation', Journal of Financial Stability, 5 (3), September, 224-55 3. Steven L. Schwarcz (2008), 'Systemic Risk', Georgetown Law Journal, 97 (1), 193-249 4. Ben S. Bernanke (1983), 'Nonmonetary Effects of the Fina