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Köp båda 2 för 6908 krEdited by Sebastian Eyre, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Michael G. Pollitt, Professor of Business Economics, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, UK
Contents: Introduction Sebastian Eyre and Michael G. Pollitt PART I CLASSICS A Economics 1. F.P. Ramsey (1927), A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, Economic Journal, 37 (145), March, 4761 2. Harold Hotelling (1938), The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, Econometrica, 6 (3), July, 24269 3. R.H. Montgomery (1939), Government Ownership and Operation of the Electric Industry, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 201, January, 439 4. James C. Bonbright (1941), Major Controversies as to the Criteria of Reasonable Public Utility Rates, American Economic Review, 30 (5), February, 37989 5. Nancy Ruggles (19491950), Recent Developments in the Theory of Marginal Costs Pricing, Review of Economic Studies, 17 (2), 10726 6. M. Boiteux (1960), Peak-Load Pricing, Journal of Business, 33 (2), April, 15779 B Regulation 7. Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson (1962), Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, American Economic Review, 52 (5), December, 105269 8. George G. Stigler and Claire Friedland (1962), What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, Journal of Law and Economics, 5, October, 116 9. George J. Stigler (1971), The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 321 10. Sam Peltzman (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), August, 21140 11. Harold Demsetz (1968), Why Regulate Utilities?, Journal of Law and Economics, 11 (1), April, 5565 12. Leonard W. Weiss (1975), Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in Almarin Phillips (ed.), Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets, Chapter 5, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 13573 13. Andrei Shleifer (1985), A Theory of Yardstick Competition, RAND Journal of Economics, 16 (3), Autumn, 31927 14. Richard A. Posner (1971), Taxation by Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 2250 15. William Stanley Jevons (1885), The Coal Question in England, Science, 5 (108), February, 1756 PART II INCENTIVE REGULATION 16. William J. Baumol (1982), Productivity Incentive Clauses and Rate Adjustment for Inflation, Public Utilities Fortnightly, 110, July, 1118 17. Richard Schmalensee (1989), Good Regulatory Regimes, RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (3), Autumn, 41736 18. David E.M. Sappington and Dennis L. Weisman (1994), Designing Superior Incentive Regulation: Modifying Plans to Preclude Recontracting and Promote Performance, Public Utilities Fortnightly, 132 (5), March, 2732 19. Paul L. Joskow (2013), Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks, in Nancy L. Rose (ed.), Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, Chapter 5, Chicago, IL and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 291344 PART III COMPETITION IN GENERATION 20. Paul L. Joskow (1997), Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (3), Summer, 11938 21. Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft (2005), A Capacity Market that Makes Sense, Electricity Journal, 18 (7), August/September, 4354 22. Eric S. Schubert, David Hurlbut, Parviz Adib and Shmuel Oren (2006), The Texas Energy-Only Resource Adequacy Mechanism, Electricity Journal, 19 (10), December, 3949 23. Richard Green and Nicholas Vasilakos (2010), Market Behaviour with Large Amounts of Intermittent Generation, Energy Policy, 38 (7), July, 321120 PART IV MARKET POWER 24. David M. Newbery (1995), Power Markets and Market Power, Energy Journal, 16 (3), 3966 25. Severin Borenstein, James B. Bushnell and Frank A. Wolak (2002)