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Köp båda 2 för 4510 krThe role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates ov...
Edited by Eric B. Rasmusen, Dan R. and Catherine M. Dalton Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, US
Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Eric B. Rasmusen PART I GENERAL 1. Ian Ayres (1990), Playing Games with the Law 2. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Robert H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev (1997), Review Dialogue: On Game Theory and the Law 3. Eric A. Posner (2000), Agency Models in Law and Economics 4. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View PART II BARGAINING AND PROCEDURE 5. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1989), Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution 6. I.P.L. Png (1983), Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial 7. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs 8. Lucien Arye Bebchuk (1996), A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue 9. Keith N. Hylton (1994), An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain 10. Ian Ayres (1991), Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations PART III CONTRACTS 11. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1992), Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules 12. Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs 13. J. Mark Ramseyer (1991), Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan PART IV TORTS, CRIME, AND TAXES 14. John Prather Brown (1973), Toward an Economic Theory of Liability 15. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation 16. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement 17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law PART V COURTS 18. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), The Selection of Disputes for Litigation 19. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases 20. Frank H. Easterbrook (1988), Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions Name Index