The Economics of Executive Compensation (inbunden)
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Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
1312
Utgivningsdatum
1999-02-01
Förlag
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Illustrationer
indexes
Dimensioner
244 x 169 x 100 mm
Vikt
2728 g
Antal komponenter
2
Komponenter
2 Hardbacks
ISBN
9781858987941

The Economics of Executive Compensation

Inbunden,  Engelska, 1999-02-01
10103
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The rapid rise in the earnings of top executives is a distinctive feature of modern capitalism. This important two volume collection presents some of the most influential published theoretical and empirical papers on executive compensation. Topics include: Theoretical Foundations of Executive Pay; Executive Compensation and Company Performance; Relative Performance Evaluation; Determinants of Executive Compensation; The Effects of CEO Pay; Accounting Measures in Executive Contracts; CEO Turnover; CEO Pay Internationally; Economic Environments and Executive Pay. The Economics of Executive Compensation draws together a wide range of literature and will be an essential reference guide for students, researchers and practioners.
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Övrig information

Edited by Kevin F. Hallock, Dean, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University and Kevin J. Murphy, Professor of Finance and Business Economics, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, US

Innehållsförteckning

Contents: Volume I: Introduction Part I: Theoretical Foundations of Executive Pay 1. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure 2. Bengt Holmstrom (1979), Moral Hazard and Observability 3. Eugene F. Fama (1980), Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 4. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts 5. Bengt Holmstrom (1982), Moral Hazard in Teams 6. Sherwin Rosen (1982), Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings 7. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem Part II: Executive Compensation and Company Performance 8. Wilbur G. Lewellen and Blaine Huntsman (1970), Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance 9. Kevin J. Murphy (1985), Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis 10. Anne T. Coughlan and Ronald M. Schmidt (1985), Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation 11. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives 12. Sherwin Rosen (1992), Contracts and the Market for Executives 13. Joseph G. Haubrich (1994), Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem Part III: Relative Performance Evaluation 14. Rick Antle and Abbie Smith (1986), An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives 15. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers Part IV: Determinants of Executive Compensation 16. Kevin J. Murphy (1986), Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts 17. Wilbur Lewellen, Claudio Loderer and Kenneth Martin (1987), Executive Compensation and Executive Incentive Problems: An Empirical Analysis 18. Charles A. OReilly III, Brian G. Main and Graef S. Crystal (1988), CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of Two Theories 19. Jonathan S. Leonard (1990), Executive Pay and Firm Performance 20. Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker and Robert E. Verrecchia (1991), Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation 21. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1992), Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence 22. David Yermack (1995), Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively? Name Index Volume II: Part I: The Effects of CEO Pay 1. Robert Tempest Masson (1971), Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance 2. James A. Brickley, Sanjai Bhagat and Ronald C. Lease (1985), The Impact of Long-Range Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth 3. Hassan Tehranian and James F. Waegelein (1985), Market Reaction to Short-Term Executive Compensation Plan Adoption 4. Anup Agrawal and Gershon N. Mandelker (1987), Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions 5. John M. Abowd (1990), Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance? 6. Patricia M. Dechow and Richard G. Sloan (1991), Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem: An Empirical Investigation 7. Keith C. Brown, W.V. Harlow and Laura T. Starks (1996), Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry Part II: Accounting Measures in Executive Contracts 8. Paul M Healy (1985), The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions 9. Robert M. Bushman and Raffi J. Indjejikian (1993), Accounting Income, Stock Price, and Managerial Compensation 10. Richard G. Sloan (1993), Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation 11. Jennifer J. Gaver, Kenneth M. Gaver and Jeffrey