The Economics of Budget Deficits (inbunden)
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Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
1112
Utgivningsdatum
2002-11-01
Förlag
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Illustrationer
name index
Dimensioner
244 x 169 x 88 mm
Vikt
2234 g
Antal komponenter
2
Komponenter
2 Hardbacks
ISBN
9781858987989

The Economics of Budget Deficits

Inbunden,  Engelska, 2002-11-01
8362
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The Economics of Budget Deficits provides a comprehensive overview of the scholarly literature exploring the causes and consequences of deficit spending and the public debt. Incorporating classical, Keynesian and public choice analyses of debt-financed public expenditures, the two volumes contain major theoretical and empirical contributions to the debate. They cover such critical fiscal policy issues as the history and measurement of budget deficits, the question of who bears the burden of the public debt, the use of deficits to solve problems of dynamic policy inconsistency and the relative effectiveness of fiscal rules and constitutional constraints as mechanisms for achieving budget balance. The editors provide an authoritative introduction to the two volumes and separate overviews of each of the seven parts. The Economics of Budget Deficits is an indispensable reference for all scholars and students interested in fiscal policy and for all policymakers.
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'. . . a valuable resource for anyone interested in public finance issues. The editors have pulled together the most important and influential articles in the field. From Adam Smith to the present, the two-volume set is a comprehensive guide to the budget deficit debate.' -- Daniel J. Mitchell, Public Choice

Övrig information

Edited by the late Charles K. Rowley, former General Director, The Locke Institute, Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Director, Program in Economics, Politics and the Law, James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, George Mason University, US, William F. Shughart II, J. Fish Smith Professor in Public Choice, Utah State University, US and the late Robert D. Tollison, formerly Professor of Economics, Clemson University, US

Innehållsförteckning

Contents: Volume I Acknowledgements Introduction Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II and Robert D. Tollison PART I THE HISTORY AND MEASUREMENT OF BUDGET DEFICITS Part I Overview Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II and Robert D Tollison 1. Gary M. Anderson (1986), The US Federal Deficit and National Debt: A Political and Economic History 2. Alberto Alesina (2000), The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States 3. Mario I. Blejer and Adrienne Cheasty (1991), The Measurement of Fiscal Deficits: Analytical and Methodological Issues 4. Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Bernd Raffelhschen (1999), Generational Accounting Around the Globe 5. Jody W. Lipford (2001), How Transparent is the U.S. Budget? PART II CLASSICAL PUBLIC DEBT THEORY Part II Overview Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II and Robert D. Tollison 6. Adam Smith (1776/1976), Of Publick Debts 7. T.R. Malthus (1803/1992), Of Poor-laws, continued 8. David Ricardo (1817/1951), Taxes on Other Commodities than Raw Produce 9. John Stuart Mill (1848/1965), Of a National Debt PART III KEYNESIAN PUBLIC DEBT THEORY Part III Overview Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II and Robert D Tollison 10. John Maynard Keynes (1936/1973), The Marginal Propensity to Consume and the Multiplier 11. Abba P. Lerner (1943), Functional Finance and the Federal Debt 12. Abba P. Lerner (1948), The Burden of the National Debt 13. Paul A. Samuelson (1948), Fiscal Policy and Full Employment without Inflation 14. Paul A. Samuelson (1970), Fiscal Policy and Full Employment without Inflation PART IV THE BURDEN OF DEBT REEXAMINED Part IV Overview Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II and Robert D. Tollison 15. J.E. Meade (1958), Is the National Debt a Burden? 16. J.E. Meade (1959), Is the National Debt a Burden? A Correction 17. James M. Buchanan (1958), Concerning Future Generations, Chapter Four, and A Suggested Conceptual Revaluation of the National Debt 18. Richard A. Musgrave (1959), Classical Theory of Public Debt 19. Abba P. Lerner (1961), The Burden of Debt 20. Franco Modigliani (1961), Long-Run Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies and the Burden of the National Debt 21. James M. Buchanan (1964), Public Debt, Cost Theory, and the Fiscal Illusion 22. James Tobin (1965), The Burden of the Public Debt: A Review Article 23. James M. Buchanan (1966), The Icons of Public Debt 24. James Tobin (1966), Reply Name Index Volume II Acknowledgements An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I PART I RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE IN THE DOCK Part I Overview Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison 1. Robert J. Barro (1974), Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? 2. Martin Feldstein (1976), Perceived Wealth in Bonds and Social Security: A Comment 3. James M. Buchanan (1976), Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 4. Robert J. Barro (1976), Reply to Feldstein and Buchanan 5. Gerald P. ODriscoll, Jr. (1977), The Ricardian Nonequivalence Theorem 6. Robert J. Barro (1979), On the Determination of the Public Debt 7. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1980), The Logic of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 8. Paul Evans (1993), Consumers are not Ricardian: Evidence from Nineteen Countries 9. T.D. Stanley (1998), New Wine in Old Bottles: A Meta-Analysis of Ricardian Equivalence PART II PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC DEBT: THEORY AND EVIDENCE Part II Overview Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison 10. Edgar K. Browning (1975), Why the Social Insurance Budget is too Large in a Democracy 11. Torsten Persson and Lars E.O. Svensson (1989), Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences 12. Amihai Glazer (1989), Politics and the Choice of Durability 13. A